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In this paper I respond to important concerns about the policies I believe 
poor developing states may be permitted to use in responding to losses 
associated with high skill migration, when those losses do indeed exist. I 
take up Joseph Carens’s invitation to broaden the debate to consider the 
moral duties we may have surrounding the brain drain debate, given our 
unjust world. In response to Eszter Kollar, I show why the liberal state may 
sometimes justifiably control how citizens use their talents, especially in 
insisting that they use them to reduce compatriots’ neediness. I consider 
Kieran Oberman’s challenge that proper consideration of the human right 
to emigrate blocks the state’s ability to use programs such as compulsory 
service ones. I reply to Hillel Rapoport’s presentation of empirical evidence 
suggesting that there are important gains to be secured from high skill 
migration. I show why the empirical evidence presented is insufficient to 
make the relevant case. I also show why none of the challenges presented 
are sufficient to block the normative project of investigating how poor 
developing states may permissibly respond to losses associated with high 
skill migration. In particular, I argue that carefully crafted compulsory 
service and taxation programs may permissibly be used by such states 
under certain conditions.
Keywords: brain drain, migration, service, tax, moral duties, right to 
emigrate.
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INTRODUCTION
The contributors offer a stimulating collection of essays. I thank them for 
their reflective comments on whether and, if so how, high skill migration 
should matter in attempts to reduce global injustices. In what follows I 
cannot respond to all the many fine points made, however, I will take up at 
least one central issue raised by each author. In this paper I address answers 
to questions raised by Joseph Carens, Eszter Kollar, Kieran Oberman, and 
Hillel Rapoport, respectively, namely: What are our moral duties in an 
unjust world and do they include duties to use our skills in ways that benefit 
the community? May the liberal state rightfully control citizens’ use of 
their talents, insisting they address the needs of compatriots? Does 
adequate consideration of the human right to emigrate block all attempts 
to implement “compulsory service” programs?  What is the role of empirical 
evidence in debates about appropriate policy responses to losses associated 
with the brain drain and does our current state of knowledge about that 
evidence suggest there is no need to be concerned about high skill 
migration?
1. WHAT ARE OUR MORAL DUTIES IN AN UNJUST WORLD? 
A RESPONSE TO CARENS
There is much in Joseph Carens’s rich discussion worthy of detailed 
engagement. Here I focus mainly on his core invitation to broaden out the 
discussion to consider the moral duties involved with high skill migration, 
especially in an unjust world. As Carens says: “Leave aside for a moment 
questions about legal restrictions. Do skilled medical personnel in poor 
states have a moral duty to stay at home and put their abilities to use in 
serving their fellow citizens? Do they act unjustly if they move to a rich 
state, even if they are legally free to do so?” (Carens 2017: 141) As Carens 
views the arguments of the book, 
“we don’t really get the fuller sort of inquiry that would be required 
to explore questions about the nature and extent of our moral duties 
to contribute to the political communities in which we live and 
whether we have any obligations beyond what can be extracted from 
a formal contractual arrangement. This is an important question for 
the brain drain because if skilled medical personnel in poor states 
only stay at home as long as it takes to fulfill the requirements of a 
reasonable contractual agreement, the existence of such policies 
will not do much to remedy the problem” (Carens 2017: 142, added 
emphasis).
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Now, I disagree that the package of proposals I offer concerning service 
and tax will not do much to address core problems unless citizens remain 
in countries of origin. These are empirical issues to a large extent, but if 
Jagdish Bhagwati’s calculations about taxation are to be relied upon, the 
revenue received could in fact make significant contributions to remedying 
deprivation (Bhagwati and Hansen 2009).1 
Let me make two other points of clarification before I discuss his central 
challenge. First, even though I argue for adopting policies that have the 
effect of managing migration in ways that promote fair outcomes for 
countries of origin, I do not assume that my policies will in fact restrict 
emigration. I accept that many people want to leave their countries of 
origin and I offer policies that try to ensure countries of origin are not 
always net losers from such arrangements. My primary purpose in the 
book is to argue for a view about fair terms of departure in efforts to remedy 
the situation in which terms of exit often heavily favor destination countries 
and migrants, and disadvantage those left behind in countries of origin. So 
when skilled citizens leave countries of origin that have subsidized the 
acquisition of such skills, and they leave in ways that create heavy losses 
for those countries of origin, what if anything, may such citizens 
permissibly be asked to do in attempting to address such disadvantage?
In preparation for an answer to that question, we have to confront 
another: how do we improve the situation in countries of origin so that 
citizens can genuinely choose to remain? How should we address the root 
causes of why people would like to leave in such high numbers? I have quite 
a bit to say about that (for instance, Brock 2009a). But I note that whatever 
we do to improve matters, it is likely that significant wage differentials 
between countries will remain. That is likely to be a near sufficient reason 
for many to seek to migrate. So the issue of ensuring fair terms of departure 
for poor, developing countries of origin is still salient, even if we are 
successful in improving quality of life in countries of origin.
So, on to the central invitation. I very much welcome this opportunity 
to engage in discussion about the moral duties. In fact, it was reflection on 
the moral duties that led me towards the political and legal solutions for 
which I advocate. In order to see why, I need to back track and explain the 
reasoning that led me in this direction. As I later also illustrate, Carens’ 
own reasoning on these issues suggests a similar progression once we 
1  Apart from Kollar, most of the authors ignore my proposals concerning taxation. 
This is slightly odd given that these are meant to be equally important to the service 
proposals and, in many ways, take account of concerns that some might have with service. 
The two policies might be seen as a good combination package that countries should adopt 
together: some of the perceived weaknesses with one policy measure can be accommodated 
by the other.
07Brock.indd   163 27/4/17   9:21
164 Gillian Brock 
LEAP 4 (2016)
begin the moral analysis.
When we consider our moral duties in an unjust world, we need to think 
about a range of prior and surrounding questions such as these:
(MD1) What do people need for a decent life?
(MD2)  What can reasonably be expected of others in helping people 
to secure a decent life?
(MD3)  What is my share of responsibilities in helping people to secure 
decent lives?
In answering the first question, what a decent life minimally requires, I 
argue why the following are core areas for concern (e.g. Brock 2009a; Brock 
and Blake 2015: ch. 2):
(C1) Enabling people to meet their needs
(C2) Protecting core liberties
(C3) Securing fair terms of co-operation
(C4)  Supporting social and political arrangements that can underwrite 
(C1)-(C3).
I also argue that just and effective institutions are central vehicles that 
can deliver on what we need for decent lives. In addition to global 
institutions, there are many state-level institutions that should be a focus 
for concern. State-level institutions are an important site of co-operation 
that ought to aspire to fairness. Furthermore, in the world we actually live 
in, much responsibility for ensuring core ingredients necessary for decent 
lives is devolved to states. For instance, states ensure the availability of key 
goods such as healthcare, safe water, sanitation, education, and security. 
States are also ideally positioned to regulate and develop the economy in 
pro-poor or otherwise beneficial ways. Effective, legitimate, and 
accountable states can play an important part in reducing injustice in our 
world today. 
So what is my share of this duty to assist with (C1)-(C4), in particular, 
my share of helping to provide strong, just institutions and effective states? 
It seems to me that discussion towards an answer might start off assuming 
that we all have equal duties to assist, but further reflection could plausibly 
yield a more complicated picture that makes use of other relevant factors 
such as capacities to assist, contributions to the problematic situation, and 
patterns of benefits. For instance, because of the important connection 
between the ability to provide core goods and services (such as healthcare 
or education) and those capable of assisting with their provision, it may be 
reasonable to expect those with such skills to play a special role in certain 
conditions. In working out what special role such people may play, it is 
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relevant to consider what others may also reasonably be expected to do, 
both within my country and outside of it. It is plausible to arrive at a view 
that we share responsibilities for remedying the situation and that our 
shares may be adjusted depending on how many others are available to 
shoulder responsibility, and along with a variety of other factors, such as 
their different capacities, patterns of relevant benefits, and contributions 
to unjust institutions that persist. 
Would it be fair to expect people to stay when others are doing nothing? 
Should we encourage people to stay under certain situations where this 
involves grave personal sacrifice? If so, what of their hopes and dreams? I 
think here the kinds of contributions —levels of sacrifice, if you will —we 
are asking people to make in remaining is highly relevant. What is at stake 
for a citizen in asking her to stay will depend on a number of situational 
features. It is one thing to ask a doctor of Xhosan heritage to remain in 
South Africa in a post-apartheid world; it is another to ask her to remain in 
1986, when her basic human rights would not have been secure. A doctor 
who chooses to remain in Syria in 2016 is a moral hero, clearly performing 
supererogatory acts, not someone merely discharging his basic moral 
duties. Reflection on the kinds of contributions people are being asked to 
make informs my view about what kind of government must minimally be 
in place, as an important indicator of the kinds of sacrifices people are 
being asked to make. A situation in which a government is making good 
faith efforts to protect basic human rights (and being somewhat successful 
at doing this) typically requires much less sacrifice from those who remain 
than a situation in which this is not the case, and constitutes a key reason 
why asking the Syrian doctor to remain now or the Xhosan doctor to 
remain in 1986, calls for heroic acts rather than basic moral duties. So, 
while there might be a place for social norms that encourage people to stay, 
we have to be mindful of excessive burdens. People can help in all sorts of 
ways other than being present in a community and putting their own lives 
at risk. We should also not ignore the important role that large revenue 
streams into public budgets can play in securing core ingredients for 
decent lives, at least under the right circumstances.
Furthermore, human beings are highly social creatures with a deep 
sense of fairness and reciprocity that operates within their relevant groups. 
The behavior of others has a reasonably strong bearing in formulating 
views about what fairness requires of me, here and now. In short, we have 
to make room for the reasonable thought “I’m willing to play my part on 
condition that similarly placed others do theirs”. So an appreciation of 
others’ duties, how they are discharging them, and how duties will be 
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enforced, is relevant to my sense of what moral duty requires. Another 
highly relevant issue is what to do in a situation where others are not doing 
their fair share. What, if anything, can be done to enforce compliance with 
a fair allocation of duties? In these ways, I think reflection on these aspects 
of moral duties lends itself to consideration of the reliable authorities that 
may be able to enforce compliance. And so, inevitably, I believe we get to 
the political and legal issues from the moral reflections. Here, consideration 
of all the agents who share responsibilities is relevant as well. Agents from 
the developed world have a huge role to play. To give one example, they 
undermine states’ abilities to be effective by supporting a variety of global 
practices and institutions that undermine revenue-raising capacity in all 
countries. In virtue of their capacities to make reforms, their contributions 
to the problems, and their patterns of benefit, it is clear their share is large. 
But what if they refuse to play their part or do too little? What are the moral 
duties in such cases? Of course, agents from the developing world might 
well press on, arguing that they ought to do more. But when their calls fall 
on deaf ears, what else may they do? When there is a high level of deprivation, 
what may developing countries do to solve their own problems themselves, 
in a context in which affluent developed states are not complying with the 
demands of justice? Under relevant circumstances, some in developing 
countries may be asked to do “a bit more” and a lot will depend on what “a 
bit more” consists in. Consider some of the things called “compulsory 
service programs” in our actual world:
(CS1)  A one-year module of underserved community service and 
training is part of the degree requirements (call this a standard 
residency requirement).2
(CS2)  There is a delay (such as one year) between completing the ed-
ucation necessary to be awarded the degree and the awarding 
of the degree.
(CS3)  There is a requirement to complete a module of underserved 
community service (of one year’s duration) as part of the re-
quirements to gain a license to practice in that state.
(CS4)  There is a requirement to complete a one-year term of under 
served community service in order to be considered for post-
graduate training.
(CS5) Service in underserved communities is required on completio 
of the degree for a period of one year. 
2  We could offer a perfectly good educational justification for this. We surely want 
people to be able to apply their skills successfully and this requires a period of practical 
training. If governments offer these practical training opportunities they may defensibly 
direct service to underserved areas.
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Notice that none of (CS1)-(CS4) restricts rights to emigrate in any 
straightforward way. In the second option, many students may choose to 
spend the year between completion of their studies and award of the 
degree within the country. They may wisely judge that they will be more 
employable in other countries once they receive their formal qualifications. 
During that year they may be heavily dependent on government 
employment and governments may be able to steer them towards 
underserved communities. This may have the same effect as (CS5). So, 
none of (CS1) through (CS4) presents any relevant problems concerning 
restrictions on emigration.  All these options are entirely liberty respecting 
and, through careful design, manage to secure service for underserved 
areas. A country could adopt a so-called compulsory service program such 
as any of (CS1)-(CS4), and I expect few of the contributors to this symposium 
would have any problems with this form of so-called compulsory service. 
So, what about the seemingly different proposal labeled (CS5)? Does 
that present unreasonable burdens? Does it remove migrants’ rights to 
leave?
One very important consideration is how any contracts to serve would 
be enforced. On my preferred account of enforcement, people should be 
permitted to leave states even if they do not comply with their contractual 
agreements. Compensation for breaches of service contracts should be 
pursued as we do with other breaches of contract. So, to take one example, 
consider violations of agreements concerning child support or alimony. 
Host countries have used wage garnishments and denial of licenses to 
enforce contracts. Destination countries have a range of ways to help 
enforce contracts, and there is some good precedent for co-operation here, 
if we consider the legal arrangements around child support and bilateral 
treaties that are aimed at ensuring compliance.3 
Do programs such as (CS1) —(CS5) present unreasonable burdens? I 
have suggested that none of (CS1)-(CS4) do present unreasonable burdens; 
in fact they are rather light on burdening those with great capacities to 
help others, capacities that have been developed while making use of 
public resources. (CS5) demands a little more in asking migrants to delay 
plans for one year, but not so much more that it crosses into being an 
unreasonable burden under the circumstances. (We see further defense of 
this claim in the next section.) In my view, a case can be made that each of 
(CS1)-(CS5) could constitute the “bit more” a citizen of a developing 
country might reasonably be expected to do.
3  I should also note that I have argued for other mechanisms such as the ability to 
buy out of service contracts, so there are already other provisions in place that make 
migration unproblematic, should someone wish to leave.
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Notice again how I have indicated that the core question is this:
When there are net losses from high skill migration, what may devel-
oping countries do to solve their own problems, in a context in which 
affluent developed states are not complying with the demands of jus-
tice? 
My arguments are focused on helping developing countries formulate 
permissible policies that they can implement here and now, without having 
to wait any longer for non-compliant developed world actors to discharge 
their duties. In other places I do discuss the duties developed world actors 
have (e.g., Brock 2009a; Brock 2014; Brock 2009b), but here my focus is 
firmly on developing states and the actions they may permissibly take.
Let me emphasize some other core features of my account that are 
necessary for such normative views to be justified and are useful in 
rebutting further objections. I argue that a poor, legitimate, developing 
state may implement carefully crafted compulsory service and taxation 
schemes at least when five important sets of conditions are met. For 
instance, states must meet legitimacy conditions, citizens must have 
relevant responsibilities, and certain background conditions must be met.4 
Let me emphasize three particularly relevant background conditions here:
(BC1)  Evidence from the particular country indicates that skilled citi-
zens can provide important services for which there are severe 
shortages. 
(BC2) Governments have invested appropriately in training of skilled 
workers to provide for their citizens’ needs and to promote ben-
eficial development.
(BC3)  Losses that result from skilled workers’ otherwise uncompen-
sated departure would not adequately be compensated for by 
benefits that result from citizens who leave.
For compulsory service programs such as (CS5) to be permissible in the 
cases that are my particular focus, governments must have made students 
aware of the fact that they will be expected to meet needs on completion of 
their training for a short period (such as one year), and such expectations 
should be specified in a contract students would sign before embarking on 
tertiary-level training. In addition, being present in the country must be 
important to remedying the deprivations, the compulsory service program 
should not require unreasonable sacrifices, and the costs of staying should 
not be unreasonable.
4  As proxy measures, states exercise power legitimately when they make sufficiently 
effective and credible efforts to protect human rights and provide other core goods and 
services (e.g. Brock and Blake: 2015: ch. 5). 
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For taxation programs to be permissible for the cases in view, in addition 
to the state’s being legitimate, and the relevant background conditions and 
moral responsibilities applying, it must be the case that taxation of those 
skilled citizens would assist in remedying deprivation. Governments 
should clarify expectations by specifying such taxation arrangements in 
an explicit contract which the student is required to sign before accepting 
the opportunity for tertiary-level training. The taxation program should 
not require unreasonable sacrifices.
Though most contributors to the symposium ignore the taxation 
proposals, it is plausible to see them as part of a permissible package. I take 
seriously the idea that no matter how desirable a particular developing 
country may be, in a world characterized by significant disparities in 
income or wages, this will inevitably draw some citizens away. So the 
salient question is: what constitutes fair terms of departure? Ongoing 
taxation commitments for a limited period may be part of such fair terms.
Before I conclude this section, notice that some of Carens’s own 
reflections on the moral duties nicely mirror the moves I make myself. 
Consider, for instance, these quotes from Carens:
“What sorts of norms and values is it morally permissible for a 
political community to seek to transmit with respect to the concerns 
raised by the brain drain? For example, would it be morally 
acceptable for a poor state to teach children that those with special 
gifts and opportunities for advanced training have a particular 
obligation to use their gifts and training in ways that will benefit the 
community? Would it be morally acceptable to tell students that 
they should not seek medical training unless they are willing to 
commit themselves to working within their home state over the long 
run, at least under normal circumstances, … Would it be morally 
acceptable if this sort of expectation became part of a wider social 
culture, so that most people in a poor state felt it would normally be 
wrong for skilled medical personnel to move to a rich country?” 
(Carens 2017: 142).
So, how does he believe we should answer such questions? 
“I must confess that I do not have a clear answer. On the one hand, 
like Brock and, I think, more than Blake, I am sympathetic to the 
idea that a just society can include legitimate expectations and social 
norms with respect to the ways in which people make use of their 
talents and skills. … On the other hand, we don’t live in a just world. 
So, I would also be sympathetic to a doctor or nurse from a poor state 
who said, ‘Why should I be the one to bear the burdens of serving the 
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health needs of this community especially since they are in 
important respects the byproducts of an unjust social order? Why 
shouldn’t skilled medical personnel from rich states be the ones with 
a duty to come and address these problems?’ … To be frank, that is 
just the starting point for some of the intellectual puzzles that 
emerge when we seek to talk about moral duties in an unjust world” 
(Carens 2017: 145).
As Carens’s own preliminary reflections suggest, the moral issues draw 
us into consideration of everyone else’s duties as well, as I suggested. And 
once we make that move, other salient considerations quickly line up, such 
as the ones I’ve emphasized. As I have tried to show, the political and legal 
solutions can offer important clarity missing when we consider the moral 
duties in isolation, apart from issues such as duty content, numbers of duty 
bearers and the conditions under which duties are triggered. 
I should address very briefly a matter that both Carens and Oberman 
raise, namely that I fail to say much about what rich states ought to do with 
respect to the brain drain problem.  I am not sure that is quite fair, given 
the arguments I make in Debating Brain Drain, especially Chapter 2, and 
elsewhere (such as in Brock 2009a: ch. 8; and Brock 2009b). But at any rate, 
the focus in this book is on what poor developing countries may permissibly 
do to solve their own problems themselves. So we need to focus on what is 
under their control. They may wish that developed country agents 
discharged more of their duties and may regret the existence of immigration 
restrictions in other countries. But getting developed world agents to 
change these features is not directly subject to their control. I should also 
emphasize that I do discuss immigration restrictions in other places (e.g. 
Brock 2009a), and given those extended discussions and the fact that my 
core question here is a different one, space limitations require focusing on 
the neglected question of what developing countries may do.
2. DOES THE LIBERAL STATE HAVE A RIGHT TO CONTROL 
CITIZENS’ USE OF TALENTS? A RESPONSE TO KOLLAR
As Eszter Kollar argues, the following important outstanding question 
remains with my position:
“The challenge for Brock, then, is whether she can provide an 
adequate justification of compulsory service consistent with her 
liberal commitments. Does she think that a person’s right to control 
the use of her talent can sometimes be restricted by liberal states? 
The conditions under which such a restriction is justified would 
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need to be spelled out and shown to be consistent with liberalism” 
(Kollar 2017: 114).
So, can liberal theorists provide an account of fair terms of co-operation 
that include a justification for how and why the state may restrict the use of 
our talents and skills? I think they can and I argue the case using the work 
of John Rawls, arguably the most prominent liberal theorist. 
In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls makes explicit some 
important ways in which we are to understand the Principles of Justice and 
the priority to be given to his first principle of justice concerning the weight 
to be accorded liberty. The first principle states that “Each person has the 
same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, 
which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all” 
(Rawls 2001: 42). Rawls adds this important clarification to his principle: 
“This principle may be preceded by a lexically prior principle requiring 
that basic needs be met, at least insofar as their being met is a necessary 
condition for citizens to understand and to be able fruitfully to exercise the 
basic rights and liberties” (Rawls 2001: 44). This seems to be a very sensible 
clarification to offer given the role basic needs such as security and 
subsistence play in being able to enjoy any of our civil and political rights, 
as Henry Shue and others have urged (Shue 1980; Peffer 1990). In this 
important discussion, Rawls not only clearly concedes that a principle of 
basic needs fulfillment may well be lexically prior to the principle of equal 
basic liberties, but he also adds further important points, such as that 
while there is a general presumption against imposing restrictions on 
liberties, there can be sufficient reason to do so (Rawls 2001: 44-47). Rawls 
continues the discussion with these important concessions:
“no priority is assigned to liberty as such, as if the exercise of 
something called ‘liberty’ had a preeminent value and were the aim, 
if not the sole, end of political and social justice. While there is a 
general presumption against imposing legal and other restrictions 
on conduct without a sufficient reason, this presumption creates no 
special priority for any particular liberty. Throughout the history of 
democratic thought the focus has been on achieving certain specific 
rights and liberties as well as specific constitutional guarantees, as 
found, for example, in various bills of rights and declarations of the 
rights of man. Justice as fairness follows this traditional view” (Rawls 
2001: 44-45, added emphasis).
Rawls goes on to state quite clearly that addressing needs is a 
constitutional essential, emphasizing that “… a social minimum providing 
for the basic needs of all citizens is also a constitutional essential” (Rawls 
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2001: 48). Furthermore, “the first principle… covers constitutional 
essentials” (Rawls 2001: 48). Here Rawls is making explicit that needs and 
liberties have equal standing as important constitutional essentials. 
So I think we can marshal a general argument concerning the 
importance of need satisfaction via at least two arguments. One concerns 
the equal importance of two weighty constitutional essentials. The second 
stresses the importance of ensuring for all citizens the basic liberties of 
citizenship: everyone has a claim to the basic liberties of citizenship and 
the social conditions, including satisfaction of needs, that make this 
possible or worth having. So everyone has a prior claim to appropriate 
satisfaction of their needs. Rawls does not address the issue of how we 
might press people into the service of meeting needs, but it seems the 
question must be confronted given the priority and importance to be 
accorded the satisfaction of needs. My work in Debating Brain Drain is 
aimed at answering such questions, in particular for conditions of highly 
scarce resourcing. My short answer is that certain kinds of reasonable 
contributions —sacrifices if you will —can be required of citizens under 
specified conditions. Much work is done by the particular conditions and 
the shape of the particular programs according to which citizens would be 
making contributions. In the last section I have argued why developing 
countries may make use of carefully crafted programs that incentivize or 
require such service, such as all of (CS1)-(CS5) discussed in the previous 
section. We can marshal an argument that there is sufficient reason in the 
core cases that characterize “poor, but responsible” (Brock and Blake 2015: 
ch. 4) to allow deprivation to have a bearing on liberty.
There are, of course, important questions of when and where we may 
“force” people into serving others in liberal societies. I think the framing of 
such questions often ignores the ways in which liberal societies standardly 
require such contributions —coercion, if you will —in order to secure the 
very goods liberals think of as worth having. Consider examples such as 
compulsory jury duty and income tax, both of which are standard compo-
nents of the liberal tradition of justice. Many liberal states have practices of 
compulsory jury duty in which all sufficiently competent citizens are re-
quired to make themselves available to serve on juries. I believe this can be 
justified on something like the following argument which, I hope, appeals to 
Kollar, because it considers what all citizens owe one another and govern-
ment may justifiably enforce, as each plays her part in upholding fair terms 
of co-operation. It also invokes her preferred view about fair reciprocity. 
We need a fair way to secure significant interests such as those protected 
by the right to a fair trial. Those who are sufficiently competent to 
participate appropriately in trials have the relevant capacities to secure 
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the interests protected by the rights. So it is fair to ask those with such 
capacities to assist, so long as the sacrifices demanded are reasonable. One 
important factor in deciding whether or not the sacrifices would be 
reasonable is the duration of time required for the trial. We seem to accept 
that quite significant burdens can be placed on individuals on a temporary 
basis. These burdens might include that for the trial’s duration, the juror is 
expected to defer her plans, aspirations, and projects —including those 
related to her work. This kind of coercion is justified because of the 
importance of what is at stake in ensuring the core interests, rights, and 
needs of fellow citizens in a well-functioning state. The basic interests 
being served are ones that are core for all human beings, and ones that 
states have responsibilities to secure for all citizens.
In my view, the argument for compulsory jury service generalizes to 
securing other core interests essential to enjoying basic liberties, such as 
enjoying basic healthcare and education. The extension to requiring 
capable citizens to assist with these other core interests on a temporary 
basis seems permissible via an exactly parallel argument. Of course, it is 
better if those capable of assisting with core interests (such as health, 
security, or education) do so voluntarily, and are attracted to positions 
using normal employment procedures and market incentives. But the 
question arises about what to do when there is radical under-supply relative 
to the needs for such services. What may a liberal society do to remedy 
matters? I have been arguing that carefully designed programs may 
incentivize or require such conditional service. The details of my approved 
programs all highlight the low levels of coercion required, along with the 
many options available for avoiding coercion altogether. Citizens being in 
severe need may have a bearing on what people are at liberty to do with 
their skills, especially after taxpayers have subsidized the very acquisition 
of those skills.
I do not mean to suggest that all issues have now been resolved through 
my arguments. What I do hope to have established in this section is that 
there are tools from within the liberal tradition that (1) show that what I 
am proposing is perfectly justifiable from within the liberal framework, (2) 
that, indeed, the liberal tradition already presupposes their use in 
important respects, and (3) there are ways to increase service provision for 
the needy that are entirely respectful of liberty and fair reciprocity.
I have space to deal briefly with only one other issue raised by Kollar 
and I address her claim that I view taxation and service as normatively on 
a par. I believe we have different interpretations of the passages she cites to 
substantiate her case for this position. To be clear, in my view, imposing 
taxes is easier to justify than requiring people to serve. In Debating Brain 
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Drain, the order in which I discuss these issues along with some of the 
discussion attached to those justifications —such as not wanting to let 
citizens off too lightly by assuming the payment of taxation would be 
sufficient to discharge duties —attempted to make these points. However, 
I could have been clearer on these issues, and I thank Kollar for raising 
them.
3. THE APPEAL TO THE HUMAN RIGHT TO EMIGRATE AND 
PHANTOM CONDITIONS: A REPLY TO OBERMAN
According to Oberman, I argue for emigration restrictions and, because of 
the importance of the right to emigrate, only emergency situations could 
justify such restrictions. He believes that proper consideration of the 
human right to emigrate supports his view. He also outlines an emergency 
justification for emigration restrictions. In this section I show why the 
appeal to the human right to emigrate does not support his case against 
me as clearly as he maintains.
A few points are worth underscoring before we get to that core argument. 
First, I have been at pains to show how carefully crafted proposals need not 
actually entail restrictions on emigration that are problematic, as (CS1)-
(CS4) in Section 1 illustrate. Well-designed policies may have an indirect 
effect on the timing of migration, so that citizens delay their departure or 
anyhow their departure is regulated to ensure fair terms of exit. Good 
policies need not prevent people who would like to exit a state from doing so. 
Second, we have seen that the relationship between liberty and need 
satisfaction is complicated in the liberal tradition, even under the Rawlsian 
assumption that favorable conditions obtain. As we saw in the last section, 
it is not the case that only emergencies can justify restrictions on important 
personal liberties. Through exploring some of Rawls’s work, we see how the 
liberal tradition must confront this issue in perfectly normal, non-
emergency situations. After all, the background assumption in A Theory of 
Justice is that reasonably favorable conditions exist, such that there are 
sufficient resources for everyone’s needs to be met. No emergency situation 
is encountered in these situations, and yet in such situations Rawls 
maintains that there can be sufficient reason to limit liberty in virtue of 
neediness.
Oberman’s main argument starts with recognizing the importance of 
the human right to emigrate. However, as I show next, his discussion does 
not settle the debate because it fails to appreciate all except one human 
right. There are plenty of relevant human rights that are unfulfilled in the 
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situations that are my core focus. To name just a few of the rights that are 
relevant, there are rights to health, adequate standards of living, education, 
and self-determination. The question is what to do in cases where multiple 
human rights are under threat. So, I do not think the appeal to human 
rights documents proves to be as decisive as Oberman thinks. Even from 
within these human rights documents, the state has much leeway about 
balancing salient issues, when there are several human rights in play. Let 
us review some details.
Consider UNDHR for some salient rights and, in fact, some helpful 
advice about how to weigh up the rights and duties citizens have. Articles 
13, 25, 26, 28 and 29 are all important.
Article 25.
(1)  Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the-
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food-
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, 
and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in cir-
cumstances beyond his control.
(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. 
Article 26.
(1)  Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least 
in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education 
shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall 
be made generally available and higher education shall be equally 
accessible to all on the basis of merit.
(2)  Education shall be directed to the full development of the human 
personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, toler-
ance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, 
and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the main-
tenance of peace.
Article 28.
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.
Article 29.
(1)  Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and-
full development of his personality is possible.
(2)  In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject 
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only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the 
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights 
and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of 
morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic 
society.
(3)  These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations (UNDHR 1948).
Article 13 does indeed recognize the relevant rights to emigrate: 
“(1)  Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence 
within the borders of each state.
(2)  Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and 
to return to his country” (UNDHR 1948).
However, articles such as 28 and 29 make clear that this is not any kind 
of absolute right and that it may be limited in attempts to recognize others’ 
rights and freedoms, “the just requirements of morality, public order and 
the general welfare in a democratic society” (Article 29). If we consider the 
human rights documents in their entirety, we see ample support for the 
project of trying to determine what fair contributions people may be asked 
to make in establishing societies in which everyone has the prospects for a 
decent life, including adequate protection for their most basic human 
rights.
I have space to deal with only one further issue raised by Oberman and 
here I address his “phantom conditions” argument, since it occupies such 
a large portion of his article. Oberman tries to make the case that some of 
the conditions for which I argue are not necessary to justify emigration 
restrictions. The basic problem with the phantom conditions argument is 
that Oberman misconstrues my strategy. My claim is that a certain set of 
conditions, when all met (such as in the case of “poor, but responsible”), 
can be sufficient to generate obligations to serve and pay additional taxes. 
His objections take the form of arguing that the conditions are not 
necessary. But my claim is not that they are necessary, only that they can 
be jointly sufficient such that carefully crafted compulsory service and tax 
proposals may permissibly be used in certain conditions. So, this whole 
line of argument proves to be a red herring as a criticism of my arguments, 
though it is interesting to see Oberman’s development of a case for 
emigration restrictions in emergency situations and a welcome contribution 
to the literature. 
I address Oberman’s claims about the empirical literature in the next 
section, but in closing I should say that I do not share his assessment of 
what the empirical literature shows, namely that “Among migration 
07Brock.indd   176 27/4/17   9:21
 Responsibilities In An Unjust World: A reply to... 177
LEAP 4 (2016)
economists there seems to be only one point of agreement: migration, as a 
general rule, benefits the global poor” (Oberman 2017: 107). While I 
concede there is much economic research that suggests that migration can 
lead to economic benefits for the global poor, there is also significant 
research that suggests that there are important losses, both economic and 
non-economic. 
4. WHAT IS THE ROLE OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN 
DEBATES ABOUT POLICY RESPONSES TO THE BRAIN 
DRAIN? A RESPONSE TO HILLEL RAPOPORT
We can address several misconceptions that ground Hillel Rapoport’s 
concerns by drawing on discussion from previous sections. So far I hope to 
have shown that:
1) My proposals do not attempt to ban emigration. 
2) I do not argue that those who have legitimate fears about perse-
cution should be required to sign contracts to serve. Indeed, gov-
ernments would not satisfy the legitimacy conditions if they were 
persecuting citizens and could not permissibly use the compulsory 
service and tax proposals for which I argue.
3)  The carefully constructed policies for which I advocate take the 
rights of would-be migrants very seriously.
So many of Rapoport’s concerns about the normative views can be 
addressed. What about the empirical claims? Rapoport believes my 
argument will partly collapse once he presents evidence that there are 
positive effects from high skill migration. Since my argument is a 
conditional one, and the relevant normative question is only triggered when 
there are net losses, the fact that there may be net gains in certain cases is 
irrelevant to the central normative inquiry. In the book I acknowledge that 
there are some positive effects and document several types, including the 
one he spends most time on concerning increased human capital 
formation.5 I do not presuppose that there are always and only negative 
effects.
Rapoport discusses brain gain through increased human capital 
formation in some detail. As indicated, I discuss this consideration myself 
(Brock and Blake 2015: ch. 10). Some of the critical issues I raise there 
5  His overall conclusion is that instead of limiting the “drain effect” through 
emigration restrictions, institutions should be developed to capture gains that there could 
be from the positive effects of skilled migration. I agree with that position and have 
developed such views elsewhere (e.g. Brock 2009a: ch. 8). 
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include whether this is always a sufficiently positive effect to outweigh 
other negative effects, whether the increased human capital formation 
necessarily benefits source countries sufficiently (rather than individuals 
who acquire the skills), and benefits source countries in all the areas of 
human well-being that are relevant.6 I elaborate on some of these points 
next.
As I observe in Debating Brain Drain, Chapter 10, one important benefit 
of high skill migration is increased human capital formation (as Rapoport 
discusses). However, as with all the purported benefits, we need to be 
cautious about their magnitude, whether particular gains accrue to 
particular countries, whether they are sufficient to outweigh other losses, 
and so on. So, consider the gain of human capital formation. The areas in 
which additional skills are acquired may not be very useful for source 
countries. Enhanced training can be skewed towards usefulness in the 
targeted destination countries. As Gibson and McKenzie note it can lead to 
overinvestment in some fields (e.g. geriatric medicine) that have large 
payoffs overseas rather than studying in other fields —such as tropical 
medicine more urgently needed locally (Gibson and McKenzie 2011). There 
may be little urgent need for geriatrics in situations where life expectancy 
is around 50, whereas there might be very high urgent need for those skilled 
in treating diseases common to the tropics. More importantly, when there 
is a brain gain, it is not always significant or sufficient to outweigh other 
losses. For instance, Alok Bhargava, Frederic Docquier and Yasser Moullan 
(2011) note that the magnitude of the positive effect in the medical sector 
is small and insufficient to generate a net brain gain. Furthermore, even 
when there is brain gain it does not necessarily outweigh reduced health 
outcomes from medical brain drain. Bhargava and Docquier (2008) 
observe that medical brain drain is connected with a 20% increase in adult 
deaths caused by AIDS. So, even when there is increased human capital 
formation, the net gains for those relevantly affected are far from obvious.
Rapoport maintains that even though “there are losers and winners, 
the brain drain contributes to an increase in the overall number of highly-
skilled people living in the developing world” (Rapoport 2017: 127). Even if 
this is true, it is hard to see how service programs such as (CS1)-(CS5) 
eliminate whatever incentive effects there are. Recall that my position is 
not to discourage people from leaving the country completely. Indeed, I 
assume that many high skill citizens will still want to leave, hence my 
advocating for the tax for five years (which he does not address). What 
needs to be shown is that measures such as (CS1)-(CS5) have a clear 
6  Surprisingly, Rapoport and his research associates have made several of these 
skeptical points too in previous published writings.
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dis-incentivizing effect on acquiring additional skills in the first place. No 
evidence of this kind is presented. In his contribution to this symposium, 
Rapoport claims that “the recent economic literature does not support the 
… view that brain drain is an impediment to developing countries’ current 
and future economic performance” (Rapoport 2017: 130). I do not believe 
this conclusion is justified and I give some brief reasons for this below. 
Note also that I do not focus exclusively on economic performance. When 
looking at the effects for countries of origin I include a variety of effects on 
other dimensions of human well-being, such as health outcomes and 
political institutions. Here data can be worrying.
Having studied the recent empirical literature fairly extensively in 
preparation for this book, my overall assessment of the literature is that the 
effects of brain drain vary enormously across countries and can even vary 
a fair bit over time. Relevant factors as to whether high levels of skilled 
migration is overall good or bad for particular countries include population 
size, geographical features, levels of development, skill levels in the source 
country, and language in home and host countries. What is the case for 
particular countries in sub-Saharan Africa in the health sector may not 
hold at all for effects on trade or technology transfer for citizens in India. 
Small island states are more affected by brain drain than large developing 
countries such as China, India, and Brazil (e.g. Beine, Docquier, and 
Rapoport 2008). Small countries also often lose much more than large 
countries gain (e.g. Beine, Docquier, and Rapoport 2008). Assessments of 
the state of play also vary over time. As one indication of this, consider 
these remarks made by Hillel Rapoport and research associates, in 
assessing the state of play at a particular time:
“high-skill migration is becoming a dominant pattern of international 
migration and a major aspect of globalization. The fact that 
international migration from poor to rich countries is becoming 
more of the brain drain type is a serious source of concern in 
developing countries and for the development community. Through 
the brain drain, it would seem, globalization is making human 
capital scarcer where it is already scarce and more abundant where 
it is already abundant, thereby contributing to increasing inequalities 
across countries, including among richer ones” (Docquier and 
Rapoport 2008).
Furthermore, as mentioned, even when brain gain does occur it is not 
necessarily sufficient to outweigh other bad health effects. Bhargava and 
Docquier (2008) find that medical brain drain can be associated with 
increased adult deaths from AIDS. While some studies show a positive 
correlation between the number of skilled migrants a country has in the 
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United States and levels of foreign direct investment from the US economy 
to countries from which migrants hale (Kugler and Rapoport 2007; Javorcik 
et al. 2011), others suggest caution about how generalizable these results 
are, as data sets contain only two small countries (Gibson and McKenzie 
2011).
Researchers have recently examined diaspora and network effects on 
the quality of political and economic institutions in source countries 
(Docquier and Rapoport 2012). Docquier and Rapoport (2012) advise 
caution as there are only a few papers that explore this topic.7 They note, 
“the empirical assessment of these effects is still at an early stage” 
(Docquier and Rapoport 2012: 711). Even among this sample we find a 
quite mixed result, for instance, Docquier and Marfouk (2006) find that in 
the study they undertook, brain drain may have positive effects on political 
institutions but negative ones on economic institutions (Docquier and 
Rapoport 2012: 711). While it is true that high-skill emigration can produce 
some positive network externalities, those countries that gain typically 
have large populations and large numbers of skilled citizens living in the 
diaspora. Particular policies of both the host and home countries make a 
difference as well (Docquier and Rapoport 2012: 725). There is also still 
much about which we are ignorant (Gibson and McKenzie 2011). We clearly 
need more research on a range of issues including the actual effects of 
policies aimed at reducing or capitalizing on high-skilled immigration. 
Finally, it is important to note that there can be a certain fashionable 
element to empirical research. While early research on brain drain 
indicated clear losses, this could have itself stimulated other researchers to 
investigate more closely.  In the future, researchers on this topic will raise 
other questions and collect other data, perhaps in response to perceived 
convergence. So caution is advisable when we try to make overall 
assessments on what the consensus opinion on such a vast body of evidence 
suggests is the new “received wisdom”. The data available to date suggests 
the only fair generalizations we can make at this point are that there are 
some positive, along with some negative effects of brain drain, there is 
much we still do not know, and that the effects vary considerably for 
particular countries and within particular sectors. Given that Rapoport 
himself seems to have changed his mind about some of the evidence and 
what it shows, it is worth considering the normative question apart from 
what the current state of play about the empirical evidence suggests, even 
if we are able to get agreement on what that is.
7  See also Kraay et al. (2005), and Docquier and Marfouk (2006).
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